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PETITIONER THE UPJOHN COMPANY'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING TO CLARIFY HOLDING 
COMES NOW petitioner, The Upjohn Company (hereinafter 
"Upjohn") , pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing for 
the limited purpose of clarifying the holding in its opinion of 
May 14, 1991 ("Slip op.") . Although this Court held that plaintiffs 
in this civil action for personal injury involving an FDA approved 
prescription drug could not proceed on a theory of design defect, 
the United States District Court Judge has interpreted this Court's 
opinion of May 14, 1991 to allow plaintiffs to proceed to trial on 
a strict liability design defect theory. Clarification is necessary 
and would benefit these litigants, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals when and if it reviews the rulings of the District Court 
Judge, and future litigants in Utah. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Respondents (hereinafter "plaintiffs") commenced this 
civil action against Upjohn, alleging that Mildred Lucille Coats 
died at age 83 from gunshot wounds inflicted by her daughter, 
Ilo Grundberg, on June 19, 1988. Grundberg and Janice Gray, the 
personal representative of Coats1 estate, brought this action 
alleging that Grundberg shot her mother as the result of ingesting 
the drug Halcion, a prescription drug approved by the United States 
Food and Drug Administration for the short-term management of 
insomnia. 
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Plaintiffs' Complaint stated several causes of action, 
including common law negligence, strict liability and breach of 
express and implied warranty. Upjohn challenged a number of 
plaintiffs1 claims by motions for partial summary judgment. 
Judgment was entered for Upjohn on all plaintiffs' breach of 
warranty claims. Order of October 17, 1990. Plaintiffs' 
manufacturing defect claim was dismissed. Order of December 19, 
1990. Plaintiffs did not plead an independent cause of action for 
fraud on the FDA. Transcript of Proceedings, April 15, 1991. 
At the time questions were certified to this Court, 
plaintiffs were scheduled for trial on their failure to warn claim. 
Slip op. at 2. The availability to plaintiffs at trial of their 
design defect theory depended on this Court's resolution of 
certified questions. Id. 
Upon certification, this Court specifically addressed 
the question of whether Utah adopts the "unavoidably unsafe 
products" exception to strict products liability as set forth in 
comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
On May 14, 1991, this Court held that all FDA-approved prescription 
medications are "unavoidably unsafe." This Court further held 
that manufacturers of unavoidably dangerous products should not be 
liable for a claim of design defect. 
In light of the strong public interest in 
the availability and af f ordability of 
prescription medications, the extensive 
regulatory system of the FDA, and the avenues 
of recovery still available to plaintiffs by 
claiming inadequate warning, mismanufacture, 
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improper marketing, or misrepresentation of 
information to the FDA, we conclude that a 
broad grant of immunity from strict liability 
claims based on design defects should be 
extended to FDA-approved prescription drugs in 
Utah. 
Slip op. at 16. 
On May 24, 1991, a hearing was held in the United States 
District Court to discuss the impact of this Court's holding on 
the trial of this action. The United States District Court Judge 
interpreted this Court's opinion, and denied Upjohn's motion for 
partial summary judgment on plaintiffs' design defect claim: 
Court: . . . The motion for partial summary 
judgment as to the strict liability claim is 
denied. And the matters of mismarketing, 
failure to warn, misrepresentation to the FDA 
and defective design as it is indicated may be 
presented as a matter of evidence under that 
theory. 
Proceedings of May 24, 1991, at 2, attached as Appendix A. 
The United States District Court Judge explained further 
his interpretation of this Court's opinion: 
Court: . . . I think we may need to talk about 
jury instructions and how they are going to be 
presented but within the discussion of the 
Supreme Court ruling, I consider that the broad 
discussion of defect would include design 
defect. 
That is to say, if what the Supreme Court said 
about product defects, there is a mutually 
exclusive 3 part definition, and that includes 
the universe, manufacturing, design and 
inadequate warnings. 
I do not intend to limit this case to inadequate 
warnings; it certainly is not going to include 
manufacturing flaws. It follows that it is 
within the purview of design defects. 
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And when the Supreme Court talks about the 
matter of defective or unreasonably dangerous 
product as related to the 4 or 5 matters that 
have been identified including mismarketing, 
misinformation to the FDA, inadequate warning 
and manufacturing flaws, that within that I 
think is the kind of design defect I'm talking 
about is embraced. 
(emphasis added). Id., at 3-4. 
II. RELIEF REQUESTED 
Upjohn submits that when this Court expressly reached 
"the same conclusion as did the California Supreme Court in Brown" 
(Slip op. at 10), this Court held that plaintiffs in this 
prescription drug case should be allowed to proceed to trial for 
failure to adequately warn, under the standard enunciated by this 
Court in Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah, 
1984). The United States District Court, however, has interpreted 
this Court's opinion of May 14, 1991 to allow plaintiffs to proceed 
on a strict liability theory allowing for the admission of "design 
defect" evidence. 
Upjohn respectfully submits that this Court's well-
reasoned analysis of the public policy of the State of Utah 
regarding prescription drug manufacturer liability could not and 
should not have resulted in the interpretation given to this Court's 
opinion. The Upjohn Company respectfully requests the Court to 
clarify the holding in its opinion to make clear that liability 
against a prescription drug manufacturer focuses on the 
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manufacturer's failure to communicate information to prescribing 
physicians, not on some theory of design defect. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. There is Seemingly an Ambiguity in this 
Courtfs Opinion 
This Court's opinion holds that plaintiffs could proceed 
to trial on their failure to warn claims and that liability may be 
imposed according to the standard enunciated in Barson v. E.R. 
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). Support for Upjohn's 
interpretation is found throughout the opinion. First, at page 2 
of the slip opinion, the Court stated as follows: 
Plaintiffs claim that Upjohn failed to 
adequately warn about certain adverse side 
effects of Halcion and that Halcion was 
defectively designed. The failure to warn 
claim is scheduled for trial. The strict 
liability claim based on design defect is the 
subject of Upjohn's pending summary judgment 
motion, the outcome of which depends on this 
Court's resolution of the certified question. 
(emphasis added). Although plaintiffs had alleged both a failure 
to warn and a design defect claim, this Court clearly understood 
that its ruling would determine whether plaintiffs could proceed to 
trial on both theories. This Court went on to hold that plaintiffs 
could not proceed on a design defect theory. Slip op. at 10. 
Further support for Upjohn's interpretation of this 
Court's holding is found at page 10 of the slip opinion. There, 
this Court stated: 
We agree with the principle comment k embodies, 
that manufacturers of unavoidably dangerous 
products should not be liable for a claim of 
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design defect. We are persuaded that all 
prescription drugs should be classified as 
unavoidably dangerous in design because of 
their unique nature and value, the elaborate 
regulatory system overseen by the FDA, the 
difficulties of relying on individual lawsuits 
as a forum in which to review a prescription 
drug's design, and the significant public policy 
considerations noted in Brown. We, therefore, 
reach the same conclusion as did the Supreme 
Court in Brown, albeit pursuant to a slightly 
different rationale. 
(emphasis added). 
In Brown, the California Supreme Court addressed the 
very issues presented here, and stated: 
While there is some disagreement as to its 
scope and meaning, there is a general consensus 
that, although it purports to explain the strict 
liability doctrine, in fact the principle it 
states is based on negligence. * * * That is, 
comment k would impose liability on a drug 
manufacturer only if it failed to warn of a 
defect of which it either knew or should have 
known. This concept focuses not on a deficiency 
in the product — the hallmark of strict 
liability — but on the fault of the producer 
in failing to warn of dangers inherent in the 
use of its product that were either known or 
knowable — an idea which "rings of negligence," 
751 P.2d at 476. 
Notwithstanding the seemingly clear language of this 
Court's opinion, the United States District Court Judge interprets 
this Court's opinion to hold that if plaintiffs simply allege 
"mismarketing" or "misinformation to the FDA," plaintiffs may 
proceed on a strict liability theory, which includes "design 
defect." Upjohn respectfully suggests that this is not what this 
Court held or intended. 
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United States Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce was recently 
apprised of the District Court Judge's interpretation of the May 14, 
1991 opinion. His comments demonstrate that two federal jurists 
in Utah read this Court's holding differently: 
Plaintiffs' counsel (reading to the Magistrate Judge 
the ruling of the District Court Judge): " . . . 
The motion for partial summary judgment as to 
strict liability claim is denied. And the 
matters of mismarketing, comma, failure to 
warn, comma, misrepresentation to the FDA, and 
defect in design, as it is indicated, may be 
presented as a matter of evidence under that 
theory." . . . 
Magistrate Judge: I'll tell you what troubles me in 
that language is the term "misdesign." Is it — 
Upjohn's Counsel: Defective design. 
Magistrate Judge: Defective design. That as I 
read the Utah Supreme Court is just not Utah 
law. 
Transcript of Proceedings, May 31, 1991, at 72-73, attached as 
Appendix B. 
The United States District Court Judge's interpretation 
and the Magistrate Judge's comments make it clear that there is a 
need for clarification of the holding in this Court's opinion of 
May 14, 1991. This Court did not intend by its opinion of May 14, 
1991 to allow plaintiffs to proceed on a strict liability theory 
which allows plaintiffs to present a case for design defect. 
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B. The Opinion Should Be Clarified to State 
That Plaintiffs Can Proceed on Their 
Failure to Warn Claim. 
This Court acknowledged that trial courts are poorly 
suited to address the "polycentric" problem presented by a 
prescription drug design defect claim. Slip op. at 16. The 
benefits to society in promoting the development, availability, 
and reasonable price of drugs justify the approach of denying 
plaintiffs the theory of design defect. Id. This Court has so 
ruled. 
Plaintiffs were scheduled for trial on their failure to 
warn claim. Upjohn anticipated that this Court's holding that 
plaintiffs had no design defect claim would result in the grant of 
summary judgment on that claim. Upjohn respectfully suggests that 
this Court too anticipated its ruling would have such affect. 
Slip op. at 2. At a minimum, clarification would facilitate further 
review of the District Court Judge's ruling in the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, Upjohn requests that this Court's holding 
in the opinion of May 14, 1991 be clarified by the addition of the 
following paragraph: 
Accordingly, there is no claim for design defect 
in a civil action for personal injuries 
involving FDA approved prescription drugs, and 
no evidence of design defect should be admitted 
in such a case involving an FDA approved 
prescription drug. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for these reasons, The Upjohn Company 
respectfully requests that this Court grant rehearing for the 
limited purpose of clarifying its holding in the opinion of May 14, 
1991 in accord with the particulars identified herein. 
Dated this day of June, 1991. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
By <T&mify^.^ 
Merlin 0. Bak%fr (A0180) 
Thomas L. Kay (A1778) 
Steven J. Aeschbacher (A4527) 
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THE COURT: All right. With respect to this matter 
I notice in the pleadings in this case on strict liability, 
Count 2/ there is incorporated in I lie previous pleaiiinq, which 
specifically has to do with willful and fraudulent 
[misrepresentation of information I n th»~ Food an>i Drug 
(Administration. 
There is M I so reference to i te fecit i ve <. ondjtion, 
unreasonably dangerous, defective packaging, false, misleading 
advertising!, defective-' warnings and instruct ions.-, and 
(marketing. 
The motion for partial summary judgment as to the 
strict liability claim is denied. And the matters of 
bismarketing, failure to warn, misrepresentation to the FDA 
and defective design as it is indicated may be presented as a 
(matter of evidence under that theory. 
Now it's 1.1:30. Would you like to take a quick 
1. ,• : , -
MR. POPE: Let's do that, Your Honor. 
MR. SCHEVE: Did you say evidence of defective 
|design, Your Honor, is admissible? 
THE COURT: Yes. If you want to take * quick lunch 
Iwe can come back at 12:30 or we can go on for an hour now but 
\L suggest that we do that. 
Let's take a break and I know that some of you would 
CLike to get out soon. I've indicated we'll be through no 
-L-L 
later than 4:30, We may need that much time. If we don't 
|we'l] qet out sooner but let's resume at quarter to one. 
We're in recess until then. 
(Recess was taken) 
THE COURT: Mr. Bauer, 
MR. BAUER: Your Honor, not being quite as sharp as 
[these young legal eagles, ;o\iU 1 .is'l-' f-n 1 ar i t" icat j on of 
k^our ruling at the end of this morning if 1 could state it so 
[that I can understand :i t as tc : • whei -e wp're going. 
Your Honor, if I understood you correctly, you ruled 
hat evidence *• -. * -. .. •* "\* :, 
failure to Ki^rr misleading the FDA - ;*n paraphrasing these 
Iconcer •-•  - - ' - u a .our 
[Honor rule i, understood .*o- ;:? nc. r.;fc<= tr. effect that at 
1 *• < : y a separate 
[theory of design defect under either negligence or strict 
jliabi ] I t:;r Am 1 :::oi: r ec t i i i tl la t assumption Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Well don't think 1 reached that exact 
bojnt-. i think W P \W\\ nee about jury instructions 
(and how they are 90111. t.- ;* presented but within the 
•-- --> v u l m g I consider that the 
£>road discussion • : defect would include design defect. 
• e Supreme Court said about 
broduct defects, there is a mutually exclusive 3 part 
pefinit 10 id that includes the universe, manufacturing, 
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design and inadequate warnings, 
I do not intend to limit this case to inadequate 
warnings; it certainly is not going to include manufacturing 
flaws. It follows that it is with i n the pi ix v\:l e% of design 
defects. 
And when the Supreme Con lr t t:a ] k. =J a bou t: the matter of 
[defective or unreasonably dangerous product as related to the 
4 or 5 matters that h.ivp bpen identified inrLudinq 
[mismarketing, misinformation t the FDA, inadequate warning 
and manufacti n: - < - * s • * •-*': 1 th I i lk :i s t h e k i n d 
of design defect . n talking about is embraced. 
M R •'-•":' ::- : \ * I . 
(Excerpt concluded) 
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necessarily especially in 1973, with any known hypothesis, but 
what you're going to find with respect to unusual toxicity. 
So if you find in a very high percentage of patients on the 
drug, particularly compared with placebo, very untoward 
effects, you have prospective experience, which is markedly 
different from retrospective analysis with drug experience, of 
course. 
THE COURT: I think that, Mr. Sigelman, your argument 
would make significantly greater impression if you still had 
in this case a fraud on the FDA in obtaining approval. Then 
the question of whether there had been a failure to adequately 
control the experiment, failure to properly report data, or 
withholding of information, all of that relevant to the 
clinical trial would be significant. As I understand the 
negligence issue that is before the Court now, it is not 
negligence in the submissions to the FDA. That's foreclosed 
by the Utah Supreme Court's decision and is the negligence in 
the marketing, negligence in the information that's being 
communicated concerning the use of the drug. 
MR. SIGELMAN: Your Honor, i£ I may say so, that is not 
the case. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SIGELMAN: First of all, on April 15, 1991, in 
discussing defendant's objections to the plaintiff's claims in 
the pretrial order, and this is in our response to their 
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submission to Your Honor, wherein plaintiffs requested 
sanctions and we provided you a copy, Judge Greene held three 
things with regard to plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation 
theories. One, they come in under plaintiff's negligent 
claims, in fact, which Mr. Scheve effectively admitted during 
the two days of case management in mid-April. 
THE COURT: But isn't it negligence with reference to 
the marketing of the drug? 
MR. SIGELMAN: No, it's negligent misrepresentations to 
the Food and Drug Administration which involve mismarketing 
and misinformation. Secondly, he ruled that we can bring in 
the same kind of evidence in the same kinds of claims under 
our punitive damages count. And then he ruled at that time 
that we could bring it in under the exception to the 
exception. Now Your Honor's referenced — 
THE COURT: Now the exception to the exception is 
essentially a fair marketing, fair notice claim. 
MR. SIGELMAN: It was more than that, Your Honor. It 
also involved misinformation to the FDA. It involved 
misrepresentation to the FDA, as well as mismarketing. Judge 
Greene found we could come in under all those things. And, in 
fact, Your Honor, if you look at the Utah Supreme Court 
opinion, where they talk about the exception under Comment K, 
they have a whole line of different points of the opinion as 
to what constitutes exceptions. And they're all divided by 
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commas. You have failure to word, comma, you have 
misinformation, comma, you have mismarketing, comma. It's — 
THE COURT: Now the information as I understand it, the 
Utah Supreme Court, they did not know whether fraud upon the 
FDA on misinformation to the FDA was a factor in the case. 
And they just said, "We're not excluding this as a possible 
claim." That would obviate the Unreasonably Unsafe Drug 
Standard of 402(a). We're just saying this is something that 
someone could claim. But they weren't saying that remained a 
life issue in this case. 
MR. SIGELMAN: Okay. Your Honor, if I may, Mr. 
Tomlinson has handed me part of the transcript from our May 
24, 1991 hearing before Judge Greene. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SIGELMAN: And the Court at — in this part of the 
transcript states, quote, "With respect to this matter, I 
notice in the pleadings in this case in strict liability count 
two, there is incorporated in the previous pleading, which 
specifically has to do with willful and fraudulent 
misrepresentation of information to the Food and Drug 
Administration. There is also reference to a defective 
condition, unreasonably dangerous defective packaging, false, 
misleading advertising, defective warnings and instructions in 
marketing. The motion for partial summary judgment as to 
strict liability claim is denied. And the matters of 
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mismarketing, comma, failure to warn, comma, misrepresentation 
to the FDA, and defective design, as it is indicated, may be 
presented as a matter of evidence under that theory." 
So, Your Honor, I would respectfully submit that Judge 
Greene has ruled, as of the 16th or the 24th of May, that one 
of the elements under which plaintiffs are permitted to 
proceed at trial with evidence under the exception to the 
exception, under Comment K, is with respect to 
misrepresentation to the FDA. 
THE COURT: I'll tell you what troubles me in that 
language is the term "misdesign". Is it — 
MR. KAY: Defective design. 
THE COURT: Defective design. That as I read the Utah 
Supreme Court is just not Utah law. 
MR. SIGELMAN: Well, the Utah Supreme Court said that 
if, in exchange for the immunity they were giving under 
Comment K, a company provides misinformation to the FDA, 
mismarkets a drug, etc., the product becomes defective. And 
what Judge Greene held was that the universe of what can 
happen is really a tripartite universe. And Judge Greene held 
in this transcript, and I quote, "Well, I don't think I'd 
reach that at that point. I think we may need to talk about 
jury instructions and how they are going to be presented. But 
within the discussion of the Supreme Court ruling, I 
considered that the broad discussion of defect would exclude 
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STATE OF UTAH 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Sandra Gardiner, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public within and for the County of Salt Lake and 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at 
the time and place herein set forth, and were taken down by 
me in shorthand and thereafter transcribed into typewriting 
under my direction and supervision: 
That the foregoing 101 pages contain a true and correct 
transcription of my shorthand notes so taken. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name 
and affixed my seal this 7th day of June, 1991. 
My commission expires: 
December 8, 1991 
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